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Internal Control: Progress And Perils 
Alan J. Winters 
Dan M. Guy 
American Institute of  Certified  Public Accountants 
"Progress might have been alright once but it has gone on too long." 
Ogden Nash 
Over the last five  years, internal control has been a matter of  widespread 
interest and vigorous debate, a subject where action is fast-paced  and still gain-
ing momentum. During the two preceding decades, however, internal control 
was an off-and-on  again parochial topic, subject to the vagaries of  groups who 
perceived it to be relevant and beneficial  to their objectives. These groups 
included entity managers and owners, internal and external auditors, regulators 
and legislators, private sector policy makers, and independent commissions. In 
varying degrees, each of  these groups has proffered  internal control as a solu-
tion to a number of  problems. 
The intense attention devoted to internal control over the last five  years 
(since 1986) has undoubtedly made progress in our understanding of  what inter-
nal control is and how it can be used. Professional  standards, private sector pro-
posals, legislative and regulatory initiatives, and practice and academic research 
have addressed many conceptual and practical issues. However, not everyone 
would agree that all of  these developments represent progress. Although some 
problems have been solved, some have not, and other problems have been creat-
ed. In other words, internal control theory and applications have progressed, 
perhaps in an evolutionary leap since 1986, but perils remain. 
The purpose of  this paper is to survey the progress and perils related to inter-
nal control developments over the last five  years. The content of  both categories 
is likely to be disputed and the coverage will probably be incomplete. Even the 
co-authors of  this paper are not in total agreement about what is progress and 
what is peril. Nevertheless, our objective is to review the most prominent 
advances and the most serious unresolved problems associated with internal 
control over the last half-decade.  We leave it to our reviewer to propose our 
misclassifications  and omissions. 
Some of  the developments discussed in this paper are neither new nor little 
known. They are presented for  perspective and in an attempt to be thorough. 
Other developments we discuss, however, are emerging and not yet widely 
known. We believe that both areas contain pressing questions in need of 
research. As in many other areas of  accounting research, research in internal 
control lags behind the needs of,  or is overlooked by, policy makers and practi-
tioners. This is likely a problem with the process used to identify  and communi-
cate policy and practice issues, stimulate research about them, and to foster  an 
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awareness of  existing research — that is, our internal control over useful  and 
relevant research may contain a material weakness or, at least, a reportable con-
dition. We hope that our paper gives better focus  to research needs in internal 
control. 
This paper is organized into three major sections each framed  as a question: 
(1) What is internal control? (2) What is the relationship of  internal control to 
an effective  audit strategy? and (3) What is the value of  information  about inter-
nal control? To some extent these categories overlap and other organizational 
frameworks  certainly exist, but we believe these categories aptly identify  the 
major areas where key developments have occurred during the last five  years. 
What Is Internal Control? 
Prior to 1987, there were many efforts  to define  and describe internal control. 
A number of  these efforts  were rooted in the need to postulate and understand 
the relationship of  internal control to financial  reporting and auditing, common-
ly referred  to as "internal accounting control." Several notable examples of 
these efforts  are Statements  on Auditing  Procedure  No.  54, The  Auditor's  Study 
and  Evaluation  of  Internal  Control  [AICPA, 1972], The  Report of  the AICPA's 
Special  Advisory  Committee  on Internal  Control  [AICPA, 1979], and Internal 
Control  in U.S.  Corporations:  The  State  of  the Art [Mautz, et.al. 1978]. 
Other treatises on internal control took a broader perspective, probing inter-
nal control as it relates to the organization as a whole. Some prominent exam-
ples of  these works are: Management  Control  Systems  [Anthony and Dearden, 
1972], Control  in Business Organizations  [Merchant, 1985], and Statement  on 
Internal  Auditing  Standards  No.  1, Control:  Concepts  and  Responsibilities, 
[IIA, 1983]. 
In 1987, two separate and extensive endeavors to redefine  and redescribe 
internal control began. Each of  these undertakings broadened and refined  the 
concept of  what internal control is and, in somewhat different  ways, addressed 
the need for  an authoritative or "generally accepted" definition  of  internal con-
trol. We refer  to those endeavors as SAS 55 [AICPA, 1988] and the 
Treadway/COSO [COSO, 1992] reports. 
SAS No. 55 
In February 1987, an exposure draft  of  a proposed statement on auditing 
standards (later to become SAS 55) was released. Although the proposal dealt 
principally with the relationship of  internal control to an audit of  financial  state-
ments, it also broadened the AIPCA's authoritative definition  of  internal control 
beyond that in SAP 54 and elaborated on its elements. 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 55, Consideration  of  the Internal 
Control  Structure  in a Financial  Statement  Audit,  (SAS 55) was issued in April 
1988. It introduced the term internal control structure and defined  it as consist-
ing of  an entity's "policies and procedures established to provide reasonable 
assurance that specific  entity objectives will be achieved." The standard subdi-
vided the internal control structure into three major elements: the control envi-
ronment, the accounting system, and control procedures. An appendix to SAS 
55 and a subsequent audit guide elaborate on these three elements in consider-
able detail. 
We believe that SAS 55 improved the definition  and description of  internal 
control, as it relates to financial  statement audits, in three principal ways. First, 
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it expanded the elements that comprise internal control over financial  state-
ments and that auditors, therefore,  should consider when assessing control risk. 
Second, it linked consideration of  internal control to financial  statement asser-
tions, requiring auditors to focus  their consideration of  internal control on its 
effect  on the specific  assertions being audited. Both of  these definitional 
improvements should bring progress in the form  of  better control risk assess-
ments. Third, the revised definition  specifically  embraced internal control over 
data used to apply audit procedures, for  example internal control over nonfinan-
cial data used in analytical procedures. This definitional  change brought the 
"operational" aspect of  internal control squarely within the purview of  a finan-
cial statement audit. By removing the clouded and unworkable distinction 
between accounting and administrative control in SAP 54, the new definition 
should improve both audit effectiveness  and efficiency  through the use of  oper-
ational information. 
These areas of  progress, however, are not without perils. One of  the elements 
included in the expanded definition  of  internal control, the control environment, 
contains several components that auditors may find  difficult  to evaluate and 
relate to financial  statement assertions. For example, judgments about what con-
stitutes an appropriate management philosophy and operating style or an effec-
tive organizational structure or audit committee and how those components 
affect  specific  financial  statement assertions are somewhat subjective and some-
what new to auditors. In addition, what constitutes effective  internal control 
over operational information  and, in turn, how such information  relates to finan-
cial statement assertions is largely unexplored and, we expect, not yet widely 
used in auditing. 
Research needs concerning the progress and perils of  SAS 55's definition  of 
internal control include the following  questions: 
• To what extent are auditors considering the control environment com-
ponents in assessing control risk (as opposed to assuming control risk 
is maximum)? 
• How do auditors evaluate the effectiveness  of  control environment 
components and what specific  problems are they encountering? 
• How do auditors combine or integrate the control environment with the 
other two internal control structure elements in assessing control risk? 
• How do auditors link the control environment (as a whole or by com-
ponents) to financial  statement assertions? 
• Have auditors' assessments of  control risk improved by considering 
the control environment components? 
• How and to what extent is nonfinancial  data used in an audit and how 
are controls over such data identified  and evaluated? 
Treadway/COSO Reports 
In October 1987, the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting (Treadway Commission) issued its report. Included among its numer-
ous recommendations for  reducing the incidence of  fraudulent  financial  report-
ing were several recommendations concerning internal control. One of  these 
recommendations was specifically  addressed to the question of  what is internal 
control and suggested that the committee of  organizations sponsoring the 
Treadway Commission (COSO) develop integrated guidance on internal con-
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trol. The report's discussion of  the recommendation stated that varying interpre-
tations and philosophies of  internal control existed and that a common reference 
point about what effective  internal control is was needed. 
In response to this recommendation, COSO, through an outside consultant, 
(Coopers & Lybrand) embarked on a project to develop integrated, generally 
accepted internal control guidance. An exposure draft  of  this guidance was 
issued in March 1991. After  considering comments, a revised exposure draft 
was issued in February 1992, and the final  report is expected to be issued in 
September 1992. 
The stated objectives of  the report are to establish a common definition  of 
internal control which serves the needs of  different  parties (general acceptance) 
and to provide a standard against which the internal control effectiveness  can be 
evaluated (criteria). These are admirable but ambitious goals. Their achieve-
ment would represent substantial progress. Agreement about what internal con-
trol is and how effective  internal control can be achieved would be a major step 
toward helping entities establish sound internal control and providing useful 
information  about internal control. Indeed, initial indications suggest that these 
goals may be attainable. For example, regulatory agencies charged with imple-
menting the FDIC Improvement Act of  1991 have indicated they will adopt the 
COSO report as the standard against which both the required management and 
auditor assessments of  internal control effectiveness  required by the act should 
be judged. The growth in other legislative and regulatory interest in internal 
control may provide additional impetus for  imbuing the COSO report with 
"general acceptance" (in the AICPA's auditing standards division, for  example, 
we have been involved with over a dozen regulatory agency proposals for  audi-
tor reports on internal control within the last four  months). 
More experience implementing the COSO report is needed, however, before 
its success can be evaluated. There are a number of  critics of  the report who see 
more peril than progress in its content. The major perils posed by the report can 
be classified  into two areas: (1) the definition  of  internal control and the related 
components (criteria) the report establishes for  effective  internal control, and (2) 
the measure of  significant  deficiencies  the report sets forth. 
COSO defines  internal control broadly as "a process, effected  by an entity's 
board of  directors, management and other personnel, which is designed to pro-
vide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of  objectives in one or 
more categories: effectiveness  and efficiency  of  operations, reliability of  finan-
cial information,  and compliance with applicable laws and regulations." The 
report also identifies  five  components of  effective  internal control: (1) control 
environment, (2) risk assessment, (3) control activities, (4) information  and 
communication, and (5) monitoring. These components represent criteria or 
standards for  establishing and evaluating effective  internal control. 
It seems intuitively reasonable to establish internal control categories that 
correspond to the three major categories of  entity objectives (financial  report-
ing, compliance, and operations). This categorization permits universal criteria 
to be applied to major segments of  internal control. As the COSO report states, 
these categories allow a directed focus  on internal control by different  parties to 
suit their specific  needs. Such a categorization, however, also creates a percep-
tion that internal control components within these categories are clearly identifi-
able and distinguishable and that experience and expertise in applying the 
COSO criteria is equally well-developed for  each of  these categories. 
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This perception is not valid and, although the COSO report attempts to dispel 
the inference,  our experience with numerous regulatory requests for  auditor ser-
vices on internal control demonstrates that the misperception is common. For 
example, the Chief  Financial Officers  Act of  1990 requires an auditor's opinion 
on internal control over financial  reporting, compliance with laws and regula-
tions, and certain operations objectives. In addition, the act requires auditors 
to "review management's process for  evaluating and reporting on internal 
control." 
While we have a fairly  well-developed body of  knowledge about how to 
apply the COSO criteria to internal control over financial  reporting, our knowl-
edge of  how to implement these criteria for  internal control over compliance 
and operations is extremely limited. For example, how do we implement the 
risk assessment, control activities, and information  and communication criteria 
for  the categories of  compliance with laws and regulations or operations? 
Regulatory initiatives calling for  such implementation are fast  outpacing our 
ability to provide those services. We have found  in our experience at the 
AICPA that regulators often  have unachievable expectations about the services 
independent auditors can provide regarding internal control in the compliance 
and operations categories. For example, we have had requests for  auditors to 
provide opinions that an entity has adequate internal control to ensure compli-
ance with laws and regulations requiring drug free  workplaces and nondiscrimi-
nation in providing housing. Consequently, when legislative and regulatory 
bodies request services concerning internal control, we are careful  to always use 
a modifier  with the term internal control—financial  reporting, compliance, or 
operations—to help avoid misunderstanding. 
Another concern about the COSO criteria is that certain components may be 
so subjective as to not be susceptible to reasonably consistent estimation or 
measurement. Those components most often  cited include integrity, ethical val-
ues, and management competence. Management (or auditors) may not be able 
to determine objectively whether those criteria have been satisfied,  yet their 
existence as criteria is likely to create the expectation that they have. On the 
other hand, however, the COSO criteria may currently be at the same evolution-
ary stage that generally accepted accounting principles were at forty  years ago. 
Refinement  is probably necessary and likely to occur. 
Another peril arises because the report uses the concept of  a material weak-
ness to separate effective  from  ineffective  internal control. Using this measure 
causes two problems. First, no conceptual or empirical construct of  a material 
weakness exists for  internal control over either compliance or operations. The 
construct has been developed only for  internal control over financial  reporting 
by relating deficiencies  in internal control to the likelihood of  material misstate-
ments in the financial  statements. Obviously, such a construct is not an appro-
priate measure of  a material weakness in either internal control over compliance 
or operations. In the absence of  sound definitions  of  material weaknesses per-
taining specifically  to both the compliance and operations categories, the deci-
sions of  those who evaluate internal control in those categories and those who 
use such evaluations will be subject to extreme variations in consistency and 
usefulness. 
Even though an accepted material weakness concept exists for  internal con-
trol over financial  reporting, it also poses complications. There are strong disin-
centives to concluding that such weaknesses exist. Practice experience in both 
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financial  statement audits and in engagements to report on internal control 
under SAS 30 indicates that material weaknesses rarely exist. This rarity stems 
from  the perception that their existence constitutes a violation of  the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of  1977. As a result, deficiencies  in internal control are 
almost never deemed sufficiently  significant  to be material weaknesses and use-
ful  information  about internal control is suppressed. Indeed, SAS 60 was devel-
oped to foster  the flow  of  useful  information  about internal control over finan-
cial reporting by creating an additional, lower-level deficiency  not embedded in 
legislation—a "reportable condition." Because of  the legal implications of 
material weaknesses, COSO's decision to adopt that concept is likely to perpet-
uate their rarity. 
An additional concern with the material weakness construct (for  each of  the 
three control categories) is that it may not be operational for  some of  the crite-
ria—particularly the control environment criteria. What constitutes a material 
weakness in integrity, ethical values, management competence, or management 
philosophy and operating style? Applying the material weakness concept to 
these criteria is likely to create a very fuzzy  line between effective  and ineffec-
tive internal control, with the result that the identification  of  such weaknesses 
will be rare. Moreover, the lack of  material weaknesses may lead to unwarrant-
ed implications, for  example, that management is effective. 
Research needs concerning the progress and perils of  the internal control def-
inition and criteria in the COSO report include the following  areas: 
• The extent to which the COSO report definition  and criteria has been 
adopted, voluntarily or mandatorily, by entities that report on internal 
control. 
• The implementation of  the five  COSO criteria in each of  the three inter-
nal control categories, with special considerations to the compliance and 
operations categories—problems encountered and refinements  needed. 
• The decision processes management and auditors use in deciding 
whether material weaknesses exist in each of  the three categories. 
• The application of  COSO criteria to smaller entities and specific  indus-
tries. 
• The relationship between the SAS 55 definition  of  internal control and 
the COSO definition  and the need for  reconciling SAS 55 to COSO. 
What Is the Relationship of  Internal Control to an Effective 
Audit Strategy? 
The proposal and ultimate issuance of  SAS 55 sparked considerable contro-
versy about the validity of  some of  its concepts and whether its implementation 
would have a positive or negative effect  on financial  statement audits. Because 
SAS 55 is the authoritative guidance for  forming  judgments about internal con-
trol effectiveness  and incorporating them into a financial  statement audit, con-
cerns about its conceptual validity and implementation are critical. Moreover, 
portions of  SAS 55 are being adapted as guidance in attestation standards the 
Auditing Standards Board (ASB) is developing for  auditors to use in performing 
and reporting on internal control effectiveness  using the COSO report. Thus, 
issues concerning SAS 55 have taken on added significance. 
Some of  the potential progress and perils associated with SAS 55 were dis-
cussed in the previous section. This section will consider other significant  areas 
182 
of  advances and hazards directly attributable to SAS 55. The areas of  controver-
sy we believe to be of  the greatest consequence are: (1) the meaning of  control 
risk and (2) the nature and application of  tests of  controls. 
What Is Control Risk? 
The concept of  control risk was first  recognized in auditing standards with 
the issuance of  SAS 39. Control risk was further  refined  and given more promi-
nence by SAS 47; SAS 55 sets forth  the most recent amplification  of  that con-
cept. Some commentators, however, believe that SAS 55 changed the concept 
of  control risk significantly  from  that in prior standards and made it theoretical-
ly and operationally unsound [Morton and Felix, 1990, 1991]. 
SAS 55 defines  control risk as "the risk that a material misstatement that 
could occur in an assertion will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis 
by the entity's internal control structure policies and procedures." This defini-
tion is essentially the one in SAS 47 modified  to accommodate the SAS 55 
requirement that control risk be assessed at the assertion level. The fundamental 
disagreement over this definition  is whether it means that the assessed level of 
control risk must always represent the auditor's belief  (estimate) about the true 
but unknown level of  control risk or whether, for  audit efficiency  reasons, an 
auditor may decide not to confirm  that belief  and arbitrarily set control at the 
highest possible level (100%). 
The essence of  this disagreement was stated clearly and concisely by Morton 
and Felix [1990] " ...[I]t seems unreasonable to assume that an auditor either 
has no beliefs  until competent evidential matter is collected, or that his beliefs 
are irrelevant unless sufficient  evidential matter is collected to provide a basis 
for  reliance thereon." Some believe that such an assumption, instead of  being 
unreasonable, is prudent. Stated differently,  what support should exist for  a 
belief  that the level of  control risk is below 100% before  that belief  can be used 
in the audit? Should auditors be permitted1 to use beliefs  for  which they have 
not gathered evidence or should they be required to obtain evidence to support 
those beliefs  before  they are used in the audit process? 
Research about internal control judgments has been abundant and fruitful. 
Additional consideration is needed, however, of  how audit effectiveness  differs 
when auditors use beliefs  about control risk that are unsupported by tests of 
controls as opposed to when auditors assume control risk is 100%. Some impor-
tant questions are: 
• When an auditor has a tentative but unconfirmed  belief  that control 
risk is less than 100% but believes it is inefficient  to perform  tests of 
controls to confirm  the belief,  what is the role of  those unconfirmed 
beliefs  in the audit process (normative and descriptive)? 
• When an auditor has a tentative but unconfirmed  belief  that control 
risk is less than 100% but believes it is inefficient  to perform  tests of 
controls to confirm  the belief,  what is the affect  on the audit process of 
setting control risk at 100%? 
1 Morton & Felix [1991, pp. 4-5] strongly imply that use of  an unsubstantiated belief  that control 
risk is less than 100% should not only be permitted but required. The rationale is that the audit will 
be more effective  than if  the auditor assumes control risk is 100% and audits accordingly. 
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The meaning of  control risk raises other questions apart from  financial  state-
ment audits. Because the risk model is incorporated in the attestation standards, 
control risk applies to assertions other than financial  statements. Therefore,  in 
addition to questions about the meaning of  control risk in financial  statement 
audits, audit policy makers are being confronted  with questions about the mean-
ing of  control risk in the context of  an audit of  an entity's compliance with laws 
and regulations and its operations results. Even more modernistic and intriguing 
are questions about the meaning of  control risk in an audit of  internal control— 
that is, what does control risk mean and how should it be considered when an 
auditor is engaged to express an opinion on the effectiveness  of  internal control 
over financial  reporting, compliance, or operations? 
What Are Tests of  Controls? 
Tests of  controls are audit procedures performed  to evaluate the effectiveness 
of  the design or operation of  internal control structure policies or procedures. 
They consist of  four  major categories: 
(1) Inquiry of  appropriate entity personnel. 
(2) Inspection of  documents and reports. 
(3) Observation of  the application of  policies or 
(4) Reperformance  of  the application of  policies or procedures by the 
auditor. 
This definition  and description of  tests of  controls, summarized from  SAS 
55, is probably the most controversial aspect of  the standard. 
Some commentators on SAS 55 believe that its construct of  tests of  controls 
has reduced the extent and relaxed the nature of  control testing [for  example, 
Kinney and Felix, 1992]. Other commentators believe that the construct has 
achieved exactly the opposite effect—control  testing is more prevalent and 
more focused  than it was prior to SAS 55 [see, for  example, Sullivan, 1988]. 
Commentators in the first  group believe that "tests of  controls" has had a 
deleterious effect  on audit effectiveness  that manifests  itself  in (1) a de-empha-
sis of  testing controls at the transaction level, (2) a de-emphasis of  reperfor-
mance tests, and (3) a decline in the use of  sampling in testing controls. They 
believe that these conditions are symptomatic of  underauditing; that inquiry, 
observation, and document inspection are inherently less rigorous and reliable 
than reperformance;  and that sampling is significant,  if  not essential, to proper 
evaluation of  control effectiveness. 
Remarkably, commentators who support the test of  controls concept in SAS 
55 agree that the three conditions enumerated above have occurred, but believe 
that they reflect  a shift  to a more effective  audit approach brought about by SAS 
55. In other words, SAS 55 was intended to create the above three conditions as 
a means of  improving audit effectiveness. 
Indeed, the explanation for  different  interpretations of  the same set of  events 
lies in the perception of  what constitutes audit effectiveness.  Most proponents 
of  SAS 55 believe that previous internal control standards failed  to concentrate 
the auditor's internal control consideration on the primary sources of  misleading 
financial  statements: improper or biased selection and application of  accounting 
principles, biased judgments about accounting estimates, and inaccurate or 
incomplete disclosures. Instead, in their view, the old standards focused  the 
auditor's internal control efforts  primarily on financial  statement misstatements 
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resulting from  clerical or processing mistakes. 
This perception of  what the focus  of  internal control work should be under-
lies the broadening of  the definition  of  the internal control structure in SAS 55. 
The expansion was intended to direct the auditor's control work toward control 
components considered to be most relevant to the major sources of  financial 
statement misstatements. As a result, the expanded definition  brought the con-
trol environment and the accounting system directly into the scope of  the audi-
tor's consideration. SAS 55 accommodated these two new control components 
by recognizing tests suitable to their nature. These tests were labeled tests of 
controls and included the types of  procedures set forth  in the initial paragraph of 
this section. 
The design and operation of  most of  the control environment components 
and many of  the accounting system components cannot be tested at the transac-
tion level, or by reperformance,  or through the use of  sampling. Yet these com-
ponents are much more closely associated with the primary causes of  financial 
statement misstatements than are controls over individual transactions. 
Furthermore, because of  the increased use of  EDP applications, the most effec-
tive approach to considering the control procedures component is often  to focus 
on the higher-level, supervisory control procedures (general controls). These 
control procedures also cannot be tested at the transaction level, or by reperfor-
mance, or through the use of  sampling. 
Whether SAS 55 has created a proper focus  on internal control, whether 
auditors have understood and implemented that focus  in their audit approaches, 
and whether the tests of  controls established by the standard provide reliable 
evidence and are being implemented properly will no doubt continue to be 
debated. These questions pose important research opportunities for  assessing 
the progress and perils of  SAS 55. 
What Is the Value of  Information  About Internal Control? 
Effective  internal control is valuable because it helps achieve objectives. In 
addition, however, there is a growing belief  that information  (reports) about the 
effectiveness  of  internal control is also valuable. The value of  such reports is 
virtually indisputable for  some uses. For example, reports about internal control 
effectiveness  are indispensable to management in achieving sound control. In 
fact,  one of  the five  COSO criteria, monitoring, explicitly recognizes the need 
for  such information.  Reports about internal control for  other than manage-
ment's use, however, is viewed as progress by some and peril by others. It is the 
value of  these other uses we discuss in this section. Throughout the remainder 
of  the paper, we use the term "reports" to mean an independent auditor's report 
on an entity's internal control. Although such reports may not be accompanied 
by a separate management assertion on internal control effectiveness,  we con-
sider such an assertion to be at least implicit. 
Calls for  reports on internal control are not new. Various bodies have pro-
posed or supported both voluntary and mandatory reports. These groups include 
independent private-sector commissions (Cohen & Treadway Commissions), 
legislators & regulators (Wyden & Dingell and SEC), and professional  groups 
(AICPA and FEI). Although it is not our purpose to recount this history, a good 
summary of  it can be found  in Appendix A of  the COSO report. 
More activity in the area of  reports on internal control effectiveness  has 
occurred during the last five  years than at anytime in the past. Although some 
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recommendations have come from  the private sector (notably the Treadway 
Commission) and some reports have been issued voluntarily by public compa-
nies, by far  the most activity has been in government. The following  list pro-
vides some examples of  internal control reports that the government has man-
dated within the last five  years and that involve independent auditors. 
• FDIC Improvement Act of  1991 
• CFO Act of  1990 
•OMB Circular A-133 
• Government Auditing Standards (Yellow Book) 
• HUD Program Audit Guide 
• Student Financial Assistance Programs Guide 
• Mortgage Banker Single Audit Program 
• REA Borrower Audits Program 
• Aviation Safety  & Capacity Expansion Act of  1990 
In addition to these recent initiatives, other requirements for  reporting on inter-
nal control have existed for  some time, for  example reports involving casinos, 
investment companies, depository trust companies, securities transfer  agents, 
and a myriad of  entities subject to OMB Circular A-128—each of  these situa-
tions also include some type of  independent auditor involvement. 
The content of  current internal control reports varies in at least eight major 
areas: 
(1) Category of  internal control reported on (financial  reporting, compli-
ance, or operations). 
(2) Aspect of  internal control reported on (design, placed in operation, or 
operating effectiveness). 
(3) Presence or absence of  separate management assertion (report) about 
internal control. 
(4) Criteria used to judge internal control quality (SAS 30, SAS 55, 
COSO, agreed-upon criteria). 
(5) Measure of  deficiencies  to be reported (material weakness, reportable 
condition, material inadequacy). 
(6) Auditor service (examination, agreed-upon procedures, by-product of 
other services). 
(7) Assurance provided (opinion, negative assurance, negative/positive 
assurance, findings  only). 
(8) Report distribution (public, restricted). 
This brief  overview of  current reporting on internal control demonstrates a 
strong demand for  such reports and the serpentine reporting practices associated 
with them. Whether the demand reflects  an intrinsic utility in such reports is 
arguable. (After  all, the demand is largely regulator induced and not subject to 
free  market considerations of  cost and benefit.)  Whether the cobweb of  report 
contents enhances or diminishes the meaningfulness  of  such reports is also an 
open question. 
Report Demand 
The fundamental  proposition underlying a demand for  reports on the quality 
of  internal control is that reporting on the output  of  a process is not enough. 
Reporting on the process itself  is also necessary. Stated somewhat differently,  if 
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a report about the output of  a process is available, does a report about the 
process that produced that output add incremental value?—is one type of  report 
simply a substitute for  the other? Exhibit 1 illustrates this concept using the 
three categories of  objectives presented in the COSO Report.2 
Exhibit 1 
Relationship Between Internal Control Structures and Products 
Internal Control Structure Product 
Financial Reporting Financial Statements 
Compliance with Laws & Regulations Compliance Performance 
Operations Requirements Operations Performance 
Currently, independent auditors provide assurance about each of  the three 
outputs in Exhibit 1. They audit financial  statements, express opinions on 
whether the requirements of  laws or regulations have been complied with, and 
provide assurance about whether the outcome of  operations meets certain speci-
fications. 3 As noted earlier, however, auditors also currently provide assurance 
about internal controls over financial  reporting, compliance with laws and regu-
lations, and operations. If  this latter type of  service satisfies  an unmet need in a 
cost-beneficial  manner without creating unwarranted expectations, then such 
services represent progress. If  not, perils exist. There are arguments for  both 
positions. 
Those who advocate reports on internal control usually cite two major bene-
fits.  One benefit  pertains to the act of  reporting itself  (a behavioral effect)  rather 
than to the information  content of  such reports. The premise is that reports on an 
entity's internal control will cause its management to devote more attention to 
internal control quality and, therefore,  better internal control will result. 
Improved internal control, in turn, will yield improved output, e.g., more reli-
able financial  reporting, greater compliance with laws and regulations, and bet-
ter operating performance. 
This perceived benefit  may pertain more to compliance and operations objec-
tives than to financial  reporting objectives. If  internal control (process) does not 
achieve financial  reporting objectives, then an audit of  the current-period finan-
cial statements (output) can be used to achieve those objectives—change the 
financial  statements based on the audit. Thus, even if  the act of  reporting on 
internal control over financial  reporting (process) does improve that internal 
control, it does not add anything to the achievement of  financial  reporting 
objectives beyond what an audit of  the financial  statements (output) can 
achieve. 
The same is not true for  the compliance and operations categories of  internal 
control. If  internal control (process) does not achieve current-period compliance 
2 Although this relationship is seemingly straightforward,  our experience has been that internal con-
trol over a specific  process is often  confused  with the output that process produces. 
3 As an example of  an engagement involving operations specifications,  the Environmental 
Protection Agency has requested that auditors provide assurance on the oxygenate content of  gaso-
line distributed in various areas of  the United States. 
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and operations objectives, an audit of  the current-period compliance and opera-
tions performance  (output) cannot be used to change the current-period results 
to achieve those objectives. Consequently, if  the act of  reporting on internal 
control causes management to devote more attention to internal control and 
thereby improve it, then reports on internal control over compliance and opera-
tions may add to the achievement of  current-period objectives in each of  those 
areas beyond what an audit of  the output provides. 
The other major benefit  of  reports on the quality of  internal control relates to 
their information  content. The premise is that such reports provide information 
that is not available from  reports on the output of  the process. That is, reports on 
internal control provide information  relevant to decisions about an entity that 
cannot be satisfied  by reports on the output. 
In the area of  internal control over financial  reporting, the argument has been 
made that reports about the quality of  internal control serve to provide needed 
information  about an entity that is not available from  its financial  statements 
[Hooten and Landsittel, 1991]. For example, two entities might have the same 
financial  position and operating results for  a given period yet one entity have 
sound internal control and the other inadequate internal control. Financial state-
ments do not provide information  about the quality of  internal control. Yet, the 
argument goes, the quality of  internal control is a critical indicator of  the enti-
ty's future  success. Those who make decisions about an entity need information 
about internal control to be effective  decision makers. 
Opponents of  this argument point out that its validity depends heavily on 
what categories of  internal control are reported on. Poor internal control over 
financial  reporting can be compensated for  by auditing the financial  state-
ments—annual, interim, or both. Thus, for  the financial  reporting category, the 
argument boils down to which type of  information  is least costly to provide. 
Providing information  about internal control over financial  reporting does not 
seem to supply any incremental value beyond that afforded  by audited financial 
statements—no progress, just peril. 
If,  however, the compliance and operations categories of  internal control are 
reported on, additional information  value may arise. The rationale relates to the 
inherent difference,  discussed earlier, between the category of  financial  report-
ing objectives and the categories of  compliance and operations objectives. 
Current-period compliance and operations performance  cannot be changed to 
meet objectives based on an audit of  actual results, as can financial  reporting 
performance.  Thus, reports on the quality of  internal control over compliance 
and operations may indeed provide "early warning" information  about whether 
objectives in either of  those areas will be achieved. That is, reports on internal 
control quality in each of  these areas may provide information  about risks and 
uncertainties attendant to achieving the related objectives that audits of  the actu-
al results cannot provide as quickly or cannot provide at all. Stated differently, 
although an audit of  the compliance or operations output may reveal that objec-
tives were not achieved, it may be too late to do anything about it. On the other 
hand, reports on internal control over both areas may provide time to make 
adjustments to accomplish these objectives. 
Not everyone agrees, however, that reports on internal control over compli-
ance and operations provides incremental information  in the most cost-effective 
manner. Opponents to such reports often  argue that the type of  output provided 
is the key consideration. If  historical results do not provide timely information, 
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other types of  output do. For example, improved reporting of  specific  risks and 
uncertainties or required financial  forecasts,  both attested to by independent 
auditors, have been suggested as better alternatives to reports on internal con-
trol. 
In our view, not much progress has been made in resolving the questions 
concerning the relative merits of  reports on internal control versus reports on 
output. Although the demand for  reports on internal control is growing, much of 
it stems from  legislative and regulatory requirements. This source of  demand 
raises the question of  whether reports about the quality of  internal control are of 
more value to specific  users than to the general public. 
Report Users 
Currently, reports on internal control are issued to both specific  parties, such 
as regulatory agencies, and to the general public. Unlike the general public, 
however, a specific  party's relationship with an entity may be directly affected 
by the entity's internal control. For example, a specific  party may provide fund-
ing to an entity under the condition that certain internal control requirements be 
met to help ensure that the funds  are used appropriately. Because of  such rela-
tionships, specific  parties usually have a clearer understanding of  the purpose 
and limitations of  internal control, internal control reports and the auditor's ser-
vices are generally tailored to their specific  needs, and they are able to require 
the entity to take certain actions if  internal control is deficient.  We believe, 
therefore,  that internal control reports are much more useful  for  these parties 
than for  the general public, and less likely to create perils for  management and 
their auditors. 
Reports to the general public are much more hazardous than those to specific 
users; hazardous to the public, the entity, and its auditors. The public, in gener-
al, does not have as clear an understanding of  the purpose and limitations of 
internal control as specific  parties do. In addition, the general public cannot take 
specific  actions to compel an entity to alter its internal control on the basis of  an 
internal control report. At most, members of  the investing public might alter 
their investment decisions about an entity based on the reported quality of  its 
internal control. Investors' ability to factor  information  about internal control 
into their investment decisions, as alluded to earlier, is contentious and largely 
unexamined. Public reports on internal control should be discouraged until there 
is a better understanding of  the relationship between information  about an enti-
ty's internal control and its potential for  success. 
Report Content 
As noted previously, the content of  internal control reports varies consider-
ably. Much of  the variation is attributable to the piecemeal fashion  in which 
reporting on internal control has developed. Professional  standards, instead of 
providing a general framework  for  reporting on internal control, have permitted 
considerable flexibility  in such reporting. These standards have, for  the most 
part, addressed individual internal control engagements as the need arose, creat-
ing a wide diversity of  performance  and reporting requirements. The myriad 
forms  of  internal control reports has created confusion  not only among report 
users, but also among the practitioners who are asked to provide them. 
Only recently has the ASB acted to promulgate a general framework  for 
reporting on internal control. Currently, the ASB has an exposure draft  of  an 
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attestation standard for  reporting on internal control over financial  reporting 
outstanding and is developing another for  reporting on internal control over 
compliance with laws and regulations. These standards should help achieve 
greater consistency in both the performance  standards for  internal control 
engagements and the resulting reports. 
There is concern, however, that, through the combination of  the COSO 
report criteria and the proposed attestation standard on internal control over 
financial  reporting, too much homogeneity in reports will result. If  the concept 
of  material weaknesses, as prescribed in both the COSO report and the proposed 
attestation standard, results in the virtual absence of  material weaknesses (for 
reasons discussed earlier), all reports will look alike. These boilerplate reports 
are not likely to have much information  content and, instead, serve only as a 
basis for  litigation against management and auditors if  the entity encounters 
problems in the future. 
Research needs concerning the progress and perils of  the value of  reports on 
internal control include the following  questions: 
• Does the act of  reporting on internal control cause management to 
improve internal control quality? 
• Can reports on internal control over financial  reporting, compliance, or 
operations provide information  beyond that available from  reports on 
the output? 
• How do regulators (or other classes of  specific  parties) determine their 
information  needs about internal control and use the information  in 
internal control reports? 
• How does the general public perceive and use internal control reports? 
• What is the content of  internal control reports issued to the general 
public and in what significant  ways do these reports differ? 
Summary 
The brisk activity in internal control over the last five  years has raised new 
issues about internal control and renewed emphasis on old issues. Many of  the 
developments flowing  from  this activity have gone beyond the discussion stage 
and into implementation. In several instances, implementation has been under-
taken on the faith  or perception that the actions will be beneficial  and, thus, 
have bestowed an urgency on the need to understand their effects. 
Because implementation is taking place, data now exists, and we hope is 
accessible, for  empirical research on many theoretical internal control issues. 
We hope that efforts  will be devoted to this research and that this paper will 
help to focus  them. 
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